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Why Do Firms Smooth Earnings?*
I. Introduction
Corporate earnings management has been much in the
news lately. For example, Business Week has recently
run two cover stories, one titled “Who Can You Trust?”
(October 5, 1998) and the other titled “The Numbers
Game” (May 14, 2001), that suggest that the credibility
of earnings reports is being eroded by earnings man-
agement. Arthur Levitt, Jr., chairman of the Securities
and ExchangeCommission(SEC),commentedin1998:
“Too many corporate managers, auditors, and analysts
are participants in a game of nods and winks. In the
zeal to satisfy consensus earnings estimates and project
a smooth earnings path, wishful thinking may be win-
ning the day over faithful representation.”
1
Earnings management means manipulating reported
earnings so that they do not accurately represent eco-
nomicearningsateverypointintime.Earningssmooth-
ing is a special case of earnings management involving
intertemporal smoothing of reported earnings relative
to economic earnings; it attempts to make earningslook
less variable over time. Earnings smoothing is exten-
sively documented (see Beidlerman 1973; Bannister
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helpful comments.
1. See CPA Journal (December 1998), pp. 14–19, quote on p.
14. See also Collingwood (2001) for a discussion of the evidence
on earnings management.
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and Newman 1996; Subramanyam 1996). Moses (1987) studies how various
ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors affect the extent of earnings smoothing. This raises the
question we address: why is earnings smoothing so prevalent?
If earnings are being smoothed, reported earnings must be sometimeshigher
than economic earnings and sometimes lower. It is not difﬁcult to see why
managers may want to report inﬂated earnings. But it is a lot harder to explain
why a manager reports lower earnings than what he observes. Yet, numerous
such instances have recently been discussed. For example, in 1998, the SEC
delayed approval of the acquisition of Crestar Financial Corporation by
SunTrust Banks, Incorporated until the company agreed to reduce loan loss
reserves by $100 million and restate higher earnings for the past 3 years.
2
The SEC also criticized W. R. Grace and Company for underreporting its
1998 proﬁts by $20 million. The SEC alleged that the company wasattempting
to exploit apparently diminishing marginal returns to reported earnings. When
reported earnings are high, reporting even higher earnings tends to elicit a
relatively small positive market reaction. The company may therefore want
to “hide” some of its current earnings for reporting in a future period when
earnings are lower and the marginal impact of a higher report is greater.
3
Earnings smoothing can be either “artiﬁcial” or “real.” Real smoothing in-
volves decisions that affect cash ﬂows and dissipate ﬁrm value. Examples in-
clude changing the timing of investments and providing promotional discounts
or vendor ﬁnancing to risky customers to pump up sales toward the end of the
quarter. By contrast, artiﬁcial smoothing does not affect cash ﬂows. This kind
of smoothing is achieved primarily by using the reporting ﬂexibility provided
by Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP).
4 Real smoothing has
costs that are obvious, whereas artiﬁcial smoothing has costs that are subtler,
such as those related to loss of credibility or consumption of the manager’s
time in such activities.
What the manager smooths in our model is the random variable that is the
basis for setting the ﬁrm’s price. Thus, it can be interpreted quite broadly as
anything that goes into a standard valuation model, such as “dividends,” “cash
ﬂow,” or “economic earnings.” While we choose to think of it as earnings,
the main question is whether the manager has the discretion to disguise its
true value within the boundaries of GAAP. The answer is yes. It is true that
the cash ﬂow numberreported underGAAPmaylimitthemanager’sdiscretion
over what earnings to report. But the cash ﬂow reported under GAAP is not
the construct investors use to value a stock, a contention strongly supported
by the voluminous literature in accounting that claims that cash ﬂow is not
2. See American Banker (March 11, 1999), p. 1.
3. See Boston Globe (December 23, 1998), p. D1.
4. Bannister and Newman (1996) and Defond and Park (1997) use discretionary accruals as
estimators of smoothing. Moses (1987) considers accounting changes as a smoothing device.
Michelson, Jordan-Wagner, and Wooton (1995) consider the ratio of coefﬁcient of variation in
income variable to the coefﬁcient of variation in sales as a measure of smoothing.Earnings 153
a sufﬁcient statistic for earnings for valuation purposes (see, e.g., Dechow
[1994] and the references therein).
We now explain artiﬁcial smoothing. The basic intuition is as follows: in
a perfect world with symmetric information, the volatility of the ﬁrm’s earn-
ings will be irrelevant if the shareholders are risk neutral or if they are risk
averse but can costlessly diversify away their exposure to the ﬁrm. So we
start with the assumption that there is some valuation-relevant information
about the ﬁrm that cannot be costlessly and credibly communicated to share-
holders. Investors can acquire this information at a personal cost, or they can
choose to remain uninformed.
Some investors may have to sell their shares in the futuredueto(exogenous)
liquidity reasons, such as an unexpected contingency. We assume that these
liquidity investors are mostly shareholders of the ﬁrm. As they trade with
informed investors, they lose money on average. In fact, it is their trading
loss that compensates the informed investors for their information acquisition
cost. Competition among the informed investors causes their expected trading
proﬁt to equal their information acquisition cost, producing zero ex ante ex-
pected proﬁts. Thus, the resources devoted to information acquisition are a
welfare loss absorbed mostly by the ﬁrm’s shareholders.
The key to the analysis is that, when the volatility of the ﬁrm’s earnings is
high, private information about the ﬁrm is more valuable, and more investors
become informed.
5 This means higher expected losses for shareholders who
trade for liquidity. Shareholders, therefore, abhor earnings volatility and pay
less for ﬁrms with higher earnings volatility.
The manager responds by smoothing earnings to affect market perceptions
of earnings volatility and hence the ﬁrm’s stock price. However, the market
understands this in equilibrium and is not fooled. This means that there is no
overall beneﬁt from smoothing in equilibrium. The phenomenon persists none-
theless because not smoothing when the market expects smoothing can result
in the ﬁrm’s stock price being lower than its true value. It is interesting that
what causes smoothing in our analysis is the manager’s concern about long-
term stock price performance rather than justthecurrentstockprice.A“myopic”
manager would simply inﬂate earnings.
Smoothing reduces the expected value of the time-series volatility of reported
earnings. The effect of smoothing on volatility is state contingent in that it
depends on the shocks to earnings realized in the future. We assume that these
shocks are serially uncorrelated, so smoothing reduces measured time-series
volatility of earnings because shocks in successive periods tend to offset each
other.
6 If the shocks are positively serially correlated, it is possible forsmoothing
in early periods to increase the variability of reported earnings in later periods.
5. Hereafter, earnings will mean economic earnings and not reported earnings.
6. As an example, let us consider a ﬁrm with stationary earnings with a mean of 100 and an
unknown volatility. Suppose the manager wants to smooth earnings. If the earnings realization
is in the ﬁrst period, what can the manager do to make earnings look as smooth as possible? x1
If the ﬁrm lives for two periods, an econometrician will estimate volatility by the standard154 Journal of Business
The existing literature has provided alternative explanations for earnings
smoothing. Barnea, Ronen, and Sadan (1975) argue that earnings smoothing is
a signaling device. In an overlapping generations model, Dye (1988) shows
that current shareholders may demand earnings smoothing to inﬂuence percep-
tions of potential shareholders about ﬁrm value when the manager’s contract
with current shareholders is unobservable. Fudenberg and Tirole (1995) assume
that management derives incumbency rents from continuing in the ﬁrm. Man-
agement can minimize the probability of being ﬁred by developing a smooth
performance record because the decision to ﬁre or retain depends more on
current performance than on past performance. Dividend and earnings smooth-
ing arise since these are criteria for performance judgment.
Trueman and Titman (1988) point out that high perceived earnings volatility
increases the perceived bankruptcy probability of the ﬁrm and hence its bor-
rowing cost, so earnings smoothing is cost minimizing. Lambert (1984)explains
real smoothing in a two-period moral hazard setting where the optimal contract
has second-period managerial compensation increasing in ﬁrst-period output.
Thus, whenﬁrst-periodperformanceisgood,themarginalutilityofconsumption
in the second period is low for the manager, and he reduces effort. Rozycki
(1997) uses the convexity of the tax code to explain smoothing.
What distinguishes our work from the existing literature is that earnings
smoothing is not driven by issues related to managerial self-interest, tax incen-
tives, or leverage concerns. Rather, it is solely the consequence of the manager
trying to increase his ﬁrm’s stock price by reducing the potential loss share-
holders may suffer when they trade for liquidity reasons.
7 This is not to say
that the factors examined by others are unimportant. Taken together with the
deviation of the reported earnings. If and are the reported earnings in the two periods, their yy 12
estimate of volatility will be . If the manager reports instead of
22 (y  100)  (y  100) yx 12 1 1
in the ﬁrst period, he must report in the second period. The estimate of volatility y p x  x  y 2 121
will be . Its expected value,
22 2 2 (y  100)  (x  x  y  100) (y  100)  (x  y )  11 2 1 11 1
is minimized when the manager chooses . Thus, the manager divides Var(x ), y p (x  100)/2 21 1
total expected earnings equally across two periods. For instance, if the realized earnings are 110
in the ﬁrst period, the manager “spreads” the positive shock of 10 over two periods and reports
105 in the ﬁrst period. This minimizes the manager’s expectation of the volatility estimate that
an econometrician will calculate. Smoothing, however, does not always reduce the volatility
estimate calculated by the investors. If the earnings are realized to be 110 in ﬁrst period, the
manager optimally reports earnings of 105. If second-period earnings are the manager will x , 2
report . The volatility estimate with smoothing is . The
22 x  5 (105  100)  (x  5  100) 2 2
estimate without smoothing would be . If the second-period earnings
22 (110  100)  (x  100) 2
turn out to be 105 or lower, smoothing reduces the volatility estimate. However, if the second-
period earnings turn out to be higher than 105, smoothing increases the volatility estimate. Since
realized earnings are more likely to be below 105 than above (the mean is 100), smoothing is
more likely to reduce the volatility estimate than to raise it. Further, the reduction in the volatility
estimate is likely to be larger than the increase in the volatility estimate. Thus, the manager can
minimize the expected value of the estimate of volatility by smoothing.
7. The intuition is reminiscent of the idea in Brennan and Thakor (1990) that, in choosing
between a stock repurchase and a dividend as a cash disbursement mechanism, the manager
takes into account the fact that a repurchase forces uninformed shareholders to possibly trade
against informed shareholders, whereas a dividend does not cause one group of shareholders to
be disadvantaged relative to another.Earnings 155
Fig. 1.—Time line of events
existing literature, our analysis suggests that there may be many reasons why
ﬁrms smooth earnings.
Section II lays out the model. Section III discusses theinformationacquisition
and liquidity trading process and relates it to perceptions about ﬁrm’s earnings
stream. Section IV analyzes earnings smoothing, and Section V provides a
numerical example. Section VI examines robustness issues, and Section VII
concludes. All proofs are in the appendix.
II. Model
In this section, we describe the model in detail, including the sequence of
events, the agents involved, and who knows what and when. See ﬁgure 1 for
a summary.
A. Time Line
There are four dates in the model: , , , and corre- t p 0 t p 1 t p 2 t p 3,
sponding to three time periods: the ﬁrst ( to ), the second ( t p 0 t p 1 t p
to ), and the third ( to ). A ﬁrm was started in the past 1 t p 2 t p 2 t p 3
(say, at ). The earnings of the ﬁrm for the three periods of its existence t p 0
are realized at , 2, and 3, respectively. After the earnings realization at t p 1
the ﬁrm is liquidated. Sometime during the third period (say, at t p 3, t p
), there is liquidity trading in the ﬁrm’s shares. We will explain this later 2.5
in this article.
B. The Players
The ﬁrm is all-equity ﬁnanced, with the number of shares outstanding nor-
malized to one. The manager of the ﬁrm privately observes the economic
earnings in period t and then reports to others. Besides the manager ee at rt
and the shareholders, there are many competing investors in the market who
can acquire costly private information about the ﬁrm. Since we use a market
microstructure model of trading similar to Boot and Thakor’s (1993), we
adopt their assumption that all investors are capital constrained and cannot156 Journal of Business
short-sell or trade on margin. Any investor choosing not to get informed can
still trade competitively based on publicly available information. Thus, prior
to the information acquisition, the players are the manager and the investors,
some of whom are shareholders.
After information acquisition, we have the manager and the investors, who
fall into two groups: informed and uninformed. Current shareholders are as-
sumed to be uninformed, and there are other uninformed investors as well
who do not currently own the ﬁrm’s stock. For simplicity, in the
post–information acquisition stage, we shall henceforth label the “informed
investors” as speculators and the “uninformed investors” who are not share-
holders as the market maker. Since separation among different groups of
investors occurs after information acquisition, we shall refer to all agentsother
than the manager in the pre–information acquisition stage as investors. The
market maker in the post–information acquisition stage should be thought of
as a “representative” uninformed investor.Themarketmakersetsacompetitive
price at using the common information set of all uninformed investors t p 2.5
and clears the market. The manager maximizes the shareholders’ wealth. We
assume universal risk neutrality.
C. Earnings Distribution
The earnings stream of the ﬁrm is stationary. The form of the earnings dis-
tribution is common knowledge, but the parameters of this distribution are
unknown. The earnings distribution at time t is
m  d if l p high (positive shock) t e p (1) at {m  d if l p low (negative shock), t
high with probability 0.5
lFl , ... , l p (2) t 1 t1 {low with probability 0.5,
for and 3, and so the distribution is time invariant. t p 1,2,
The parameters m and d are the mean and the volatility of the distribution,
and they are unknown to everyone, including the manager. The common prior
beliefs about the distribution of m and d are
¯ d ∼ g(d)w i t h s u p p o r t( d,d),
¯ m ∼ h(m)w i t h s u p p o r t( m,m), (3)
and m and d are independently distributed.
8
8. Note that, while the expected earnings parameter, m, in our model is constant, in reality it
may be time varying.Earnings 157
D. Managerial Discretion
The manager reports only a single number, the ﬁrm’s earnings. He has some
discretion in choosing what to report at . The manager’s report can differ t p 1
from the economic earnings by, at most, d, where is commonknowledge. d 1 0
Thus, for simplicity, we are assuming that earnings can be costlessly manip-
ulated by an amount up to d but that it is prohibitively costly to manipulate
more. This captures, in a stylized way, the notion that the manager has limited
reporting discretion.
In exercising his reporting discretion, the manager “rolls over” an earnings
“surplus” or “deﬁcit” to another time period. We assume thatthemanagercannot
“roll over” earnings forever and must settle accounts at .
9 Thus, misre- t p 2
porting at must be followed by an offsetting misreporting at . t p 1 t p 2
The discount rate is zero. Therefore, any inﬂation of earnings by $1 at
must cause a deﬂation of earnings by $1 at and vice versa. There t p 1 t p 2,
is no investment or share repurchase, and reported earnings are distributed as
dividends to the shareholders. Since total earnings equal total cash ﬂows over
the life of the ﬁrm, total dividends paid equal total cash ﬂows. We assume
that the ﬁrm is not cash constrained, and so it can pay dividends in the ﬁrst
period that exceed ﬁrst-period cash ﬂow. Everyone sees the earnings for the
third period at when the ﬁrm is liquidated and the proceeds are dis- t p 3,
tributed to the shareholders.
The assumption that the manager reports earnings as the only measure of
ﬁrm performance is a simpliﬁcation. In practice, investors receive multiple
reports, including reported earnings and cash ﬂows. These reports provide
cross-checks that limit the manager’s ability to reduce the information content
of any report. However, all that we need is that an earnings report contain
information that is valuable to investors but cannot be recovered from cash
ﬂows.
10
As mentioned in the introduction, when ﬁrm performance is reported at
discrete points in time, current earnings may contain information to predict
future cash ﬂows that current cash ﬂows do not contain. There is evidence
that earnings and cash ﬂow both have incremental information over each other
9. We do not consider a rollover of earnings to in order to simplify the analysis. This t p 3
assumption narrows the set of reporting strategies available to the manager. We believe that this
assumption is not critical for our results.
10. The extent to which earnings can be artiﬁcially smoothed is limited by realized cash ﬂows,
which cannot be misreported; there are only so many earnings values compatible with realized
cash ﬂows. But earnings cannot be inferred unambiguously from cash ﬂows, and so the manager
has some discretion in reporting earnings. Although economic earnings and cash ﬂows converge
in the long run, they differ in the short run due to revenue recognition discretion, accruals,
extraordinary items, etc.; unlike cash ﬂows, earnings attempt to match costs and beneﬁts through
time. Thus, earnings carry information that cannot be inferred directly from cash ﬂows. To see
this, consider a ﬁrm that makes a sale of $1 million and delivers goods on December 24, 2000.
The sale revenue will be received in the year 2001. The ﬁrm incurs period costs (in cash) of
$900,000. The ﬁrm uses calendar years as ﬁnancial years. If we ignore taxes, these transactions
reduce year 2000 cash ﬂow by $900,000 and increase earnings by $100,000 if the sale is
recognized in the year 2000 report.158 Journal of Business
in predicting future cash ﬂows (see Bowen, Burgstahler, and Daley 1987;
Dechow 1994).
11 Thus, introduction of other reports such as cash ﬂow would
not qualitatively change the results. The earnings report in this model should
be interpreted as the information provided by the manager that is not already
contained in cash ﬂow.
E. Liquidity Selling
During period 3, some shareholders face liquidity shocks and are forced to
sell their shares; these shares are sold at the market-clearing price at t p
and the supply (shares sold) is stochastic. The supply l in dollar terms 2.5,
has the distribution
¯ l ∼ f(l)w i ths upp o rt( l,l), (4)
and it is independent of the earnings history (economic or reported) of the
ﬁrm.
F. Information Structure
We ﬁrst specify the information sets of the players in the pre–information
acquisition stage. Let denote the information set of the manager and
j j ˆ ff
the information set of investors just after where or 2. Everyone t p j, j p 1
remembers past information, so the information sets do not decay over time.
Everyone starts with common prior knowledge about the distributions of m
and d. The manager gets to see the economic earnings at where et p j, aj
, 2, and 3. Investors do not observe and . They see only the j p 1 ee a1 a2
earnings reports and at and respectively. The economic ee t p 1 t p 2, r1 r2
earnings at are seen by everyone during liquidation. Investors set t p 3, e , a3
the price of the shares of the ﬁrm at where or 2, using the Pt p j, j p 1 j
information set and this price is observed by everyone. The price
j ˆ f , P j
depends deterministically on so it is also a part of . We will use as
jj j ˆˆ f , f E
the expectation conditional on the information set of the manager and
jj ˆ f E
as the expectation conditional on the information set of investors.
j ˆ f
Now we consider the evolution of information sets in the post–information
acquisition stage. Each investor in this economy starts with $( ). Each 1  M
can incur a ﬁxed cost of to obtain a signal g about the ﬁrm’s prospects $M
at before liquidity trading. The label speculators is used for those t p 2.5
who choose to acquire g. The signal g tells with certainty whether the ﬁrm
will experience a positive or a negative shock to earnings at . Note that t p 3
the signal does not convey any information about the value of m or d or the
11. An investor who observes only the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow sees a picture different from that seen
by an investor who sees only the earnings. Earnings and cash ﬂow together tell us more than
does either alone. In particular, if future sales are correlated with current sales, earnings may
provide information about future cash ﬂows that the current cash ﬂow does not. This illustrates
that earnings may have valuation-relevant information not contained in cash ﬂow. It is on this
information that the manager in our model exercises his reporting discretion. Thus, the manager
artiﬁcially smooths earnings even when he cannot smooth cash ﬂows.Earnings 159
exact level of earnings. The information set of speculators is before
2 ˆ f ∪ {g}
trading occurs. Speculators cannot observe the liquidity supply while making
their trading decisions. The market maker observes demand or supply that is
net of liquidity shareholders’ supply and any demand from speculators. Let
S denote the net supply seen by the market maker( ifthereisnetdemand), S ! 0
who uses information to set a market-clearing price.
12 We denote
2 ˆ f ∪ {S}
by v the measure of speculators; v is common knowledge at the time of
liquidity trading because everyone can solve the optimization problem of an
investor who has to choose whether to become informed or not, and thus
determine how many investors have become (informed) speculators.
Investors must decide whether to become informed or not before liquidity
shocks occur. We assume for simplicity that no shareholder becomes in-
formed.
13 The implications of relaxing this assumption arediscussedinSection
VI.
We want to analyze the behavior of the investors and the manager. The
ﬁrst step is to study what happens in liquidity trading at and how t p 2.5
shareholders are affected. The effect of liquidity trading on shareholders de-
pends on the mean and the volatility of the ﬁrm’s earnings. At and t p 1
investors use their perceptions of the ﬁrm’s mean and volatility to t p 2,
anticipate the outcome of the liquidity trading at and set share prices. t p 2.5
The manager knows this, and his objective is to maximize the prices of the
shares. He does this by using his earnings-reporting discretion to inﬂuence
investors’ perceptions.
III. Equilibrium Analysis of Liquidity Selling
The manager reports earnings at and . Investors try to infer the t p 1 t p 2
mean m and the volatility d of the ﬁrm’s earnings from these reports. Let the
expectations of the mean and the volatility based on investor perceptions be
and respectively. The next section discusses how these perceptions are ˆ ˆ md ,
formed.
We show below that there is a Nash equilibrium in which the measure of
investors who become (informed) speculators depends on the characteristics
of the ﬁrm’s earnings. The reason is that these characteristics determine the
ex post trading proﬁts of the speculators at and hence the marginal t p 2.5
return to getting informed. The trading proﬁts of speculators come at the
expense of shareholders who sell for liquidity reasonsandsystematicallysuffer
12. The market maker represents uninformed investors who trade competitively to clear the
market. However, we do not rule out current shareholders from trading and competing with other
uninformed investors. In fact, the shareholders will be required to clear the market when the
demand by informed investors exceeds the supply by liquidity-seeking shareholders.
13. This assumption is not critical to the analysis, as we discuss later. We can justify it, however,
by assuming that current shareholders have exorbitant information acquisition costs or are otherwise
wealth constrained.160 Journal of Business
losses in equilibrium. Thus, shareholders’ expected losses depend on the char-
acteristics of earnings.
The net supply of shares, S, observed by the competitive market maker
depends on the liquidity shareholders’ supply, l, and any demand by specu-
lators. We have
l if g signals negative shock
S p S(l,g,v) p (5) {l  v if g signals positive shock.
As we explain later, speculators demand shares only when the private signal
is favorable. If the market maker knew the liquidity supply l or the signal g,
he could ﬁgure out whether earnings would experience a positive or a negative
shock at and set price equal to the expected value of earnings, ˆ ˆ t p 3 m  d
or . However, the market maker observes only the net supply S and not ˆ ˆ m  d
l or g. Therefore, he uses prior beliefs about the distribution of liquiditysupply
to arrive at an unbiased Bayesian posterior estimate of share value. The price
function is
11 ˆˆ ˆˆ f(S  v)(m  d)  f(S)(m  d)
22
P(S,v) p .( 6 ) 11 f(S  v)  f(S) 22
The net supply S equals the liquidity supply l if speculators observe a low
signal and submit no demand. The likelihood of l being S and the signal being
low is and the ﬁrm value in this case is . If speculators observe ˆ ˆ f(S)/2, m  d
a high signal, they demand v, and so the liquidity supply must be . The S  v
likelihood of this is and the ﬁrm value in this case is . Using ˆ ˆ f(S  v)/2, m  d
Bayes’s rule and setting price equal to the ﬁrm’s expected value yields (6).
Assumption 1. The density function of liquidity supply, f, is log-
concave.
14
Assumption 1 provides a sufﬁcient condition for an economically mean-
ingful pricing function. A log-concave density function of liquidity supply
ensures that price is a decreasing function of net supply of shares.
15
From (6), we see that the share price is always between and . ˆˆ ˆˆ m  dm  d
Therefore, a speculator will never buy when he sees an unfavorable signal
and will always buy when he sees a favorable signal. As the two cases are
equally likely, the speculator’s expected trading proﬁt is
¯ l
ˆ ˆ 1( m  d)  P(l  v,v) ˆ ˆ m(m, d,v) p f(l)dl.( 7 )  2 P(l  v,v)
l
14. The density function f is log-concave if is concave in x. Some of the standard log[f(x)]
distributions satisfying this property are uniform, (truncated) normal, and (truncated) exponential.
15. See lemma A1 in the appendix for the proof.Earnings 161
Each speculator submits a $1 demand for shares when he observes a high
signal. If the shareholders’ liquidity supply is l, the net supply S observed by
the market maker is and the price is set at . Each spec- S p l  v, P(l  v,v)
ulator ends up buying shares and makes a proﬁt of ˆ ˆ 1/P(l  v,v)( m  d) 
per share. This trading proﬁt is conditional on liquidity supply l P(l  v,v)
and a high signal. The expected trading proﬁt is obtained by taking an ex-
pectation over l and then multiplying by , the probability of a high signal. 1/2
The measure of speculators, v, taken as exogenous thus far, is uniquely
determined in equilibrium by a condition of competition among investors that
says that the marginal speculator must earn zero ex ante expected proﬁt, net
of his information acquisition cost. Since we assume the same information
acquisition cost for all investors, all speculators make zero expected proﬁt in
equilibrium and investors are indifferent between becoming informed and
staying uninformed. A key result is the following.
Lemma 1. The expected trading proﬁt of each speculator is decreasing
in the measure of speculators.
The intuition is that, as more investors get informed, more of their infor-
mation enters the price. This reduces mispricing as well as the trading proﬁt
of each speculator that is based on this mispricing. We can now deﬁne
equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 1. A Nash equilibrium is a measure of speculators such
∗ v
that ; a net supply of shares as in (5); and a market
∗∗ ˆ ˆ m(m,d,v ) p MS (l,g,v ),
clearing price as in (6).
∗ P(S,v ),
We will now show that there is a unique equilibrium as deﬁned above. To
avoid the uninteresting case in which the cost of getting informed is too high
for anyone to get informed, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 2. . ˆ ˆ M ! d/2m
Proposition 1. There is a unique Nash equilibrium with the measure of
speculators, .
∗∗ ˆ ˆ v p v (m,d)
Investors know the distribution of liquidity supply, which enables them to
compute the expected trading proﬁt of a speculator asa functionofthemeasure
of speculators v, using (7). The expected trading proﬁt of a speculator is
decreasing in v, and so the number of speculators adjusts to a level such that
the expected trading proﬁt for the marginal speculator equals M. Those who
become speculators in equilibrium receive a signal about the earnings shock
the ﬁrm will receive and demand shares only if the signal is favorable. The
market maker sees aggregate demand and sets a market-clearing price such
that he expects zero proﬁt.
Liquidity-seeking shareholders suffer (ex post) losses on average when they
trade. The reason is that their tradesareinduced byexogenousliquidityshocks,
whereas those they trade with are trading strategically based on information.
If there are no speculators, the price does not depend on the order ﬂow because
there is nothing to be learned from the order ﬂow. Good and bad ﬁrms are
priced alike. Bad ﬁrms are overpriced and good ﬁrms are underpriced, but,
since all investors are trading on a “level playing ﬁeld,” nobody makes ex-162 Journal of Business
pected losses or gains. The presence of speculators reduces mispricingbecause
their trades cause their information to be noisily reﬂected in prices. The
mispricing does not vanish altogether, however, because the number of spec-
ulators is ﬁnite and the market maker cannot distinguish between liquidity
trades and informationally motivated trades. In fact, this mispricing is needed
to attract some to become speculators since their information acquisition costs
are recovered from the expected trading proﬁts generated by mispricing. If
there were no cost of information, the number of speculators would be so
large that order-ﬂow would reveal all private information and there would be
no mispricing. The order ﬂow would also be perfectly revealing if there were
no shareholders seeking liquidity. We now characterize the dependence of the
measure of speculators on the characteristics of the ﬁrm’s earnings stream.
Proposition 2. (a) The expected trading proﬁt of a speculator, m, is an
increasing function of the ratio of the perceived earnings volatility to the ˆ d
perceived earnings mean ; (b) the measure of speculators, depends on
∗ ˆ mv ,
the ratio of the earnings volatility to the earnings mean, that is,
∗∗ ˆˆ ˆˆ v (m,d) p v (d/m). (8)
Further, is an increasing function of this ratio, .
∗ ˆ ˆ vd /m
The intuition behind proposition 2 is as follows: the higher the volatility
of the earnings, the higher is the informational advantage of the speculators
over other investors. The reason is that the signal the speculators privately
observe reveals whether earnings will experience a positive or negative shock,
and the size of this shock is increasing in the volatility. Thus, if the measure
of speculators is ﬁxed, their expected trading proﬁt increases with earnings
volatility. Competition among speculators, however, results in more investors
becoming speculators when perceived earnings volatility is high, so that the
marginal speculator’s expected trading proﬁt equals the cost of acquiring the
signal.
An increase in the earnings mean has a different effect, however. Since the
signal the speculators receive contains no information about mean earnings,
they have no informational advantage over others when it comes to the mean.
But as the mean m increases, keeping the size of the earnings shock d ﬁxed,
the impact ofd relativeto m on the ﬁrm’sstockpricedecreases.Thisdiminishes
the informational advantage of the speculators and hence their ex post trading
proﬁts. This causes the measure of speculators to shrink as m, and, hence, the
volatility-to-mean ratio increases.
The following result shows that the equilibrium measure of speculators
determines the expected trading losses of liquidity-seeking shareholders at
. t p 2.5
Lemma 2. The expected trading losses of shareholders equal the infor-
mation acquisition cost of speculators.
The expected trading proﬁt of any speculator equals the marginal specu-
lator’s cost of acquiring the signal in equilibrium. All investors face the sameEarnings 163
information acquisition cost, so the expected trading proﬁts of all speculators
equal their information acquisition cost. The proﬁts come entirely at the ex-
pense of liquidity-seeking shareholders because a market maker makes zero
expected proﬁt when he clears market. The expected losses of shareholders
thus equal the information acquisition cost of speculators. This means that
these expected losses are proportional to the measure of speculators. In light
of proposition 2, the expected losses of liquidity-seeking shareholders arethus
increasing in the earnings volatility-to-mean ratio.
IV. Earnings Smoothing
To understand the manager’s incentives to smooth earnings, we need to discuss
the form of his compensation contract, the choices available to him in reporting
earnings, and the impact of earnings reports on investors’ perceptions of the
ﬁrm’s earnings stream. The manager will choose a reporting strategy that max-
imizes his expected compensation, taking into account the effect of earnings
reports on the investors’ perceptions and, consequently, on his compensation.
A. Manager’s Compensation
Since moral hazard due to unobservable effort is precluded by assumption,
current shareholders design the compensation contract to induce the manager
to report earnings to maximize the value of their shares. The compensation
contract may, in principle, be a function of all the observable variables. The
shareholders may make the compensation contingent on the reported earnings
in the three periods and on the prices after earnings reports at and t p 1
. t p 2
The shareholders’ claims are residual to the manager’s compensation. To
avoid the complication of considering the effect of the manager’s compen-
sation on the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂows, we assume that the manager’s compensation
is very small as compared with the earnings level. This allows us to ignore
the effect of a change in the manager’s compensation on the earnings.
We assume that the manager’s compensation is proportional to
a(e  P)  (1  a)P,( 9 ) r11 2
where . The compensation is linked to prices at and . 0 ≤ a ≤ 1 t p 1 t p 2
The earnings and price at are added to remove the obvious distortions t p 1
in the manager’s reporting that would arise if a dollar paid as dividend were
weighted differently from a dollar saved for the future.
B. Managerial Discretion
The earnings reported by the manager may vary from the economic earnings
by an amount ; that is, The manager, however, has to d 1 0 de  e d ≤ d. a1 r1
“clear the position” created by this manipulation in earnings. If reported earn-
ings at were higher than economic earnings by an amount x, then t p 1164 Journal of Business
reported earnings at must be less than the economic earnings by an t p 2
amount x. Similarly, lower-than-economic ﬁrst-period reported earnings must
be followed by higher-than-economic second-period earnings. The total ec-
onomic earnings in the ﬁrst two periods thus equal the total reported earnings
in the ﬁrst two periods:
e  e p e  e . (10) a1 a2 r1 r2
The discretion available to the manager is assumed low enough to permit
investors to infer from the reported earnings whether the earnings shock was
positive or negative in any period.
Assumption 3.
a); ¯ (m  m) ! 2(d  d)
b) ¯ (m  m) ! d.
Condition a ensures that investors can always use reported earnings at
to infer if there is a positive or a negative shock. This is because the t p 1
highest earnings report possible with a negative shock is less than the lowest
earnings report possible with a positive shock; that is,
¯ m  d  d ! m  d  d.
Thus, investors use the following rule to infer the kind of shock experienced
by earnings at : t p 1
high if e ≥ m  d  d r1 l p (11) 1 {low if e ≤ m  d  d. r1
The manager, however, observes the economic earnings and thus updates as
follows:
high if e ≥ m  d at l p (12) t { ¯ low if e ≤ m  d. at
Condition b ensures that investors, after observing the reports for the ﬁrst
two periods, can infer whether the earnings at experienced a positive t p 2
or a negative shock. Investors use the following rule to determine the kind
of earnings shock experienced at : t p 2
e  e r1 r2 l p l p high if ≥ m  d 12 2
e  e r1 r2 ¯ l p l p low if ≤ m  d (13) 12 2
e  e r1 r2 ¯ l and l are different if m ≤≤ m. 12 2Earnings 165
C. Perceptions about the Earnings Stream
Everyone has common prior beliefs about the parameters of the earnings
stream, given by (1) and (3). The economic earnings value conveys some
information about the mean m and the volatility d. When earnings experience
a positive shock, the earnings value equals . Therefore, a high economic m  d
earnings value is likely to be associated with a high mean and a high volatility.
When earnings experience a negative shock, the earnings value equals m 
. Therefore, a high economic earnings value is likely to be associated with d
a high mean and a low volatility. The exact effect depends on the distributions
of m and d. We assume that the uncertainty about the mean is low as compared
with the uncertainty about the volatility in a sense made precise below.
Assumption 4.
a) is increasing in S. E[ddm  d p S]/E[mdm  d p S]
b) is increasing in S, while
∗ ∗ E[v (d/m)dm  d p S] E[v (d/m)Fm  d p S]
is decreasing in S.
c) ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ E[dFd ≥ d  r, m  d p m  d  s] ≤ d  kr Gs ≥ r,r ≤ 2d,w h e r ek 
. (0, 1)
d)( d / d S)E[dFm  d p S] ≤ 0, (d/dS)E[mFm  d p S] ≥ 0.
Conditions in assumption 4 refer to rational beliefs formed after observing
economic earnings. Condition a requires that, during positive earnings shocks,
any increase in earnings causes a higher percentage increase in the expected
volatility than in the expected mean of the earnings stream. Condition b
requires that higher earnings during a positive shock or lower earnings during
a negative shock indicate high volatility and change posterior distribution of
in such a way that expected measure of speculators increases.Condition
∗ d/mv
c requires that the density functions of m and d are smooth and the uncertainty
in volatility is high, so that, conditional on the sum (the economic m  d
earnings in a high-shock period) being low, the expected value of d is suf-
ﬁciently low.
16 Condition d requires that, with a negative earnings shock, a
higher value of economic earnings leads to a perception of lower volatility
and higher mean. Conditions a, b, and c are satisﬁed if the uncertainty in
mean is low as compared with the uncertainty in volatility, while condition
d is satisﬁed for most regular probability density functions.
Assumption 4 ensures that the manager’s incentive to smooth earnings is
16. Assumption 4c can be replaced by the simpler condition ¯¯ ¯ E[dFmd p mdr] ≤ dkr
if density function g of m is log-concave (see n. 14). This simpler condition requires that there be
sufﬁcient uncertainty in volatility so that a low earnings realization during positive shock indicates
sufﬁciently low expected volatility. This leads to the condition in assumption 4c as
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯¯ E[dFmd p mds,d ≥ dr] ≤ E[dFmd p mdr, d ≥ dr]
¯¯ ¯ p E[dFmd p mdr] ≤ dkr
for . The ﬁrst inequality follows from the property that, for random variables x and s ≥ r
is increasing in S if the probability density function of x is log-concave. y,E[yFx y p S]166 Journal of Business
strong as compared with his incentive to inﬂate earnings. Earnings smoothing
reduces the perceived volatility of earnings, and earnings inﬂation increases
the perceived mean of earnings. The former strategy is effective when there
is signiﬁcant uncertainty about the volatility of earnings, and the latter is
effective when there is signiﬁcant uncertainty about the mean of earnings.
The conditions in assumption 4 assert that the uncertainty about the volatility
is high relative to the uncertainty about the mean, and so the manager’s
incentive to smooth earnings dominates his incentive to inﬂate earnings. We
later show that the optimal compensation scheme sets in (9) when a p 0
there is no trading between periods. In this case, the manager has no incentive
to inﬂate earnings, and we do not need assumption 4 for our results. As-
sumption 4 provides sufﬁcient conditions to make our analysis robust to small
changes in the compensation contract. A special case of our model is that in
which there is no uncertainty about the mean of the earnings stream. As-
sumption 4 holds trivially then, and all our results are sustained. However,
we keep the setup general for two reasons. First, it illustrates the trade-offs
that a manager faces between smoothing earnings and simply overreporting
earnings. Second, it enables us to generate an empirical predictionaboutwhich
ﬁrms are likely to smooth earnings and which are likely to inﬂate earnings.
Assumption 4 formalizes how the value of economic earnings affects in-
vestors’ beliefs about m and d. Recall that investors observe only reported
earnings, not economic earnings. The effect, however, is qualitativelythesame
if the manager’s report is a monotone function of economic earnings. Suppose
that the manager’s reporting strategy is to report higher earnings, for e , r1
higher values of economic earnings . Then the beliefs formed by investors ea1
based on observing the earnings report have the following characteristics:
1. With a positive shock to earnings, higher reported earnings lead er1
to higher .
11 ˆˆ E [d]/E [m]
2. With a negative shock to earnings, higher reported earnings lead er1
to higher and lower .
11 ˆˆ E [m] E [d]
These characteristics determine how reported earnings affect prices and P 1
. Suppose that investors have some beliefs about the manager’s reporting P 2
strategy. If the manager does not follow this strategy and reports higher earn-
ings at then he fools investors into believing that the mean level of t p 1,
earnings is higher. At the manager will have to offset this effect, and t p 2,
then investors will form correct beliefs about the mean m. Thus, the higher
perception about m has a positive effect on but no effect on . PP 12
The effect of the manager’s report on investors’ perceptions about earnings
volatility is not so straightforward. When there is a negative shock to earnings,
a high report lowers perceived volatility d. When there is a positive shock to
earnings, a high report raises perceived volatility. A high volatility is unde-
sirable from the perspective of shareholders because then they expect to lose
more at as discussed in the previous section. These expected losses t p 2.5,
affect prices and . Thus, if the manager increases reported earnings, its PP 12Earnings 167
effect on perceived volatility increases expected prices during negative shocks
but decreases expected prices during positive shocks.
The manager’s report affects and through its combined effect on the PP 12
perceived mean and volatility of earnings. During a negative shock, a high
earnings report has an unambiguously favorable effect on prices. During a
positive shock, a high earnings report has a favorable effect on because of P 1
a higher perceived m, but it has an unfavorable effect on both and because PP 12
of a higher perceived d. Since the manager’s compensation is an increasing
function of and he has an incentive to inﬂate earnings if earnings PP , 12
experience a negative shock, but the incentives are less clear if earnings
experience a positive shock. In proposition 3, we specify conditions under
which the manager wants to report low earnings during a positive shock to
earnings. We show that the manager smooths the earnings to the maximum
extent possible. The earnings report at as a function of the economic t p 1
earnings under this smoothing strategy is characterized by
e  d if l p high a11 e p (14) r1 {e  d if l p low. a11
Investors are assumed to set the prices competitively equal to the expected
value of future cash ﬂows from a share. Thus, the pricing function is
1 ∗ 22 ˆˆ ˆ P p E [e  e  (e  e )  Mv (E [m],E [d])], 1 a2 a3 a1 r1
2 ∗ 22 ˆˆ ˆ P p E [e ]  Mv (E [m], E [d]). (15) 2 a3
The prices in (15) are set as expected values of future cash ﬂows to the
shareholders conditional on the information available to them; what someone
is willing to pay for a share depends on his expected payoff from owning
that share. Given the possibility of a liquidity shock, a shareholder cannot be
sure of holding the share until the terminal date. This means that the share-
holder’s expected payoff differs from the ﬁrm’s expected terminal cash ﬂow;
it also depends on the possible trading losses the shareholder could incur,
given a liquidity shock prior to the terminal date. The price at equals t p 1
the expected value of the economic earnings in the second and third periods
plus any balance from the ﬁrst-period’s earnings (positive if the manager
reported lower than economic earnings and negative if the manager reported
higher than economic earnings) minus shareholders’expectedliquidity-trading
loss. The price at equals the expected value of third-period earnings t p 2
minus the expected liquidity-trading loss.
17
Proposition 3. For sufﬁciently low values of a, the weight placed in
17. In this sense, our model is different from other market microstructure models (e.g., Kyle
1985; Boot and Thakor 1993) in which liquidity traders expect to lose money from trading in an
ex ante sense and are thus irrational in participating. Here investors who did not own shares initially
but choose to become (uninformed) shareholders expect ex ante to break even since their expected
trading losses are absorbed by the ﬁrm through the way its stock is priced. Of course, those who
owned the ﬁrm at the outset suffer a loss in wealth because the ﬁrm stock is priced lower this way.168 Journal of Business
the manager’s compensation contract on the cum-dividend share price at
the following constitutes a sequential equilibrium for the game in the t p 1,
ﬁrst two periods:
Manager’s strategy: The manager smooths and reports earnings according
to (14) and (10).
Investors’ strategy: Investors price competitively according to (15), using
(1) and (2) to form expectations about past and future earnings, with
their beliefs about m, d, and as speciﬁed below. lt
Manager’s beliefs: The manager observes economic earnings (only at ea1
while both and at ), uses (12) to infer , and uses t p 1 ee t p 2 l a1 a2 t
(1) and (3) to form beliefs about the distributions of m and d.
Investors’ beliefs: At investors use (11) to infer Their beliefs t p 1, l . 1
about economic earnings are
¯ ¯ min(e  d,m  d)i f l p high r11 e p a1 ¯ {max(e  d,m  d)i f l p low, r11
and their beliefs about m and d are based on (1) and (3). At , t p 2
investors use (11) and (13) to infer and Their beliefs about m, d, ll . 12
and economic earnings are these: if then l p l , e p e p (e  12 a1 a2 r1
and use (1) and (3) to form beliefs about m and d.I f e )/2 l ( l , r2 12
then m p (e  e )/2, r1 r2
¯ min(e  d  m,d)i f l p high r11 d p ¯ {min(m  e  d,d)i f l p low, r11
and use (1) to infer and ee . a1 a2
The above proposition shows that when the manager’s compensation relies
sufﬁciently heavily on the price at the manager smooths earnings Pt p 2, 2
to the maximum extent possible. Recall that the manager always has an in-
centive to overreport earnings when the economic earnings experience a neg-
ative shock at . However, when earnings experience a positive shock, t p 1
a high report has two opposing effects. On the one hand, it decreases and P 1
due to a high perceived volatility. On the other hand, it increases due to PP 2 1
a high perceived mean. When the impact of volatility is more signiﬁcant (see
assumption 4a) and the manager’s compensation is very sensitive to price
the ﬁrst effect dominates, and the manager underreportsearnings.Investors, P, 2
however, rationally anticipate the smoothing behavior of the manager in equi-
librium and infer economic earnings from reported earnings to form correct
beliefs about the mean and the volatility.
It may seem surprising that smoothing would occur in a model in which
there is a one-to-one mapping from economic to reported earnings and in-
vestors are not fooled by the smoothing in equilibrium. The reason for this
result is that, given investors’ equilibrium expectation that smoothing is takingEarnings 169
place, any ﬁrm that does not smooth is worse off. Thus, what we have is a
form of prisoner’s dilemma. Smoothing is initially motivated by the ﬁrm’s
desire to reduce perceived earnings volatility, but since all ﬁrms smooth,
investors rationally “undo” the effect of smoothing, thereby leaving volatility
perceptions unchanged. Knowing that this is the equilibrium outcome, how-
ever, does not make it privately optimal for any ﬁrm to avoid smoothing,
since not smoothing when everybody else is smoothing is not the same as
not smoothing when no one is smoothing.
An interesting question this raises is whether there are multiple equilibria
in this model, one of which is an equilibrium in which no ﬁrm smooths. The
following result says no.
Proposition 4. For sufﬁciently low weight (a) assigned to the current
price ( ) in the manager’s compensation, there is no Nash equilibrium in P 1
which the manager does not smooth reported earnings.
The intuition is as follows. If no ﬁrm smooths in equilibrium, then investors
expect all ﬁrms to accurately report economic earnings. It would now pay for
a ﬁrm with high earnings volatility to smooth reported earnings to fool in-
vestors into giving it a higher price than its value to shareholders. The re-
striction on a is simply to preclude earnings inﬂation in the report. Thus, it
cannot be an equilibrium for all ﬁrms to eschew smoothing.
It is possible to visualize an alternative model in which there is partial
pooling, so that a particular report is associated with many possible values
of economic earnings. Investors will now be unable to perfectly distinguish
between ﬁrms with smooth and volatile earnings. The ﬁrms with the most
volatile earnings (bad type) will get their ﬁrst-best outcome, whereas ﬁrms
with truly smooth earnings (good type) will be worse off than in a world with
no smoothing.
Earnings smoothing reduces the time-series volatility of reported earnings,
but only in an expected sense. Sometimes smoothing will not lower volatility
because the ability of the manager to smooth is limited. Since the manager
can only shift earnings from one period to another, he cannot always report
earnings that are higher (or lower) than economic earnings. If earnings are
high in the ﬁrst period, the manager reports lower earnings and tries to spread
the positive shock over two periods. The manager must then report earnings
higher than the economic earnings in the second period. If the second-period
economic earnings turn out to be even higher than ﬁrst-period earnings, the
manager’s report may end up increasing the measured time-series volatility
of reported earnings. Thus, there can be instances where smoothing fails in
hindsight. But the ex ante probability of such events is low with serially
uncorrelated earnings shocks, and so smoothing does reduce the expected
value of the time-series volatility of reported earnings.
We now justify the manager’s compensation scheme. We assume that the
manager’s compensation contract is written by representatives of the share-
holders and aligns the manager’s interests with those of the shareholders. Al-170 Journal of Business
though not crucial to our main result that earnings smoothing is an equilibrium,
we assume that nonowners cannot observe the compensation contract.
18
The manager’s reporting strategy affects and which, in turn, deter- ee , r1 r2
mine prices and . Shareholders want to maximize their payoffs up to PP 12
. Since we assume that no trading takes place before the payoff t p 2 t p 2.5,
of a shareholder holding a share until is t p 2 e  e  P p e  e  r1 r22 a1 a2
. The manager cannot inﬂuence or and so shareholders want to Pe e , 2 a1 a2
maximize and write a compensation contract proportional to that is, set PP , 2 2
. a p 0
We can relax the assumption of no trading between and . t p 1 t p 2
Suppose that when the contract is written at shareholders expect to t p 0,
sell p shares between and . The payoff from selling a share in t p 1 t p 2
this period is whereas the expected payoff from holding a share e  P, r11
beyond is . Therefore, shareholders write t p 2 e  e  P p e  e  P r1 r22 a1 a22
a compensation contract proportional to . This is ex- p(e  P)  (1  p)P r11 2
actly the form we have in (9) with . Thus, if the fraction of shares a p p
expected to be sold between and is sufﬁciently small, the com- t p 1 t p 2
pensation contract written by the shareholders induces the manager to smooth
earnings.
V. A Numerical Example
In this section, we illustrate the smoothing equilibrium with an example. The
earnings in any period are with a positive shock (probability 0.5) and m  d
with a negative shock (probability 0.5). The earnings mean, m,i s$ 4 m  d
or $5, with probability 0.5 each, and the earnings volatility, d, is $2 or $3,
with probability 0.5 each. The manager can report earnings that differ from
the economic earnings by, at most, $1. The cost of acquiring a private signal
is $.20 for each investor. Investors have $1.20 each, and so any investor
getting informed is left with $1.00 to invest. The dollar measure of liquidity
18. We are thinking of the representative of shareholders as the board of directors (who own
stock) or a large “inside” shareholder. We can either assume that the contract they write for the
manager is unobservable to the market (and hence to small shareholders and nonowners) or ob-
servable. We prefer the unobservability assumption because it corresponds to actual practice. In
this case, the optimal contract involves and emerges as a unique equilibrium. The reason is a p 0
as follows: suppose that outsiders believe that the manager’s compensation depends only on . In P2
this case, they will expect him to smooth. Given this, it does not pay for the inside shareholders
to make the manager’s contract depend on because that reduces smoothing (completely P e 1 r1
eliminating it if the contract depends only on ) when the market expects smoothing; this P e 1 r1
will lower the stock price. By contrast, if outsiders believe that the manager’s compensation depends
only on it will pay for the inside shareholders to compensate the manager based on to P e , P 1 r1 2
induce him to smooth earnings since this will increase the stock price. Thus, paying the manager
based only on and the associated smoothing is a unique equilibrium. If we assume that outside P2
shareholders can observe the manager’s contract, the inside shareholders realize that they cannot
fool the market into believing that the manager is not smoothing when he is smoothing. Since
smoothing does not affect the stock price when the market correctly anticipates it, multiple equilibria
are possible. For example, in one equilibrium, the manager’s compensation is tied to and P e , 1 r1
there is no smoothing; in another, it is tied to and there is smoothing. P , 2Earnings 171
supply at varies between 0 and 1. Liquidity supply l has a triangular t p 2.5
distribution that peaks in the middle:
4(0.5  Fl  0.5F)i f0 ≤ l ≤ 1
f(l) p (16) {0 otherwise.
Speculators who spend $.20 to become informed at observe their t p 2.5
private signal about the earnings shock at and submit their demand for t p 3
shares only if earnings are to experience a positive shock. The market maker
sees the sum of the ﬂow of liquidity and speculator trades. He uses the
aggregate order ﬂow to form Bayesian beliefs about the nature of the shock
to earnings in the next period and then sets a market-clearing price. The
equilibrium measure of speculators, is such that the expected proﬁt
∗ v (m,d),
from trading in the future equals $.20. The expected proﬁt, and hence the
measure of speculators, depends on the characteristics of earnings. We nu-
merically compute for different m and d combinations:
∗ v (m,d)
∗ v (5,2) p 0,
∗ v (5,3) p 0.31163,
∗ v (4,2) p 0.21566, (17)
∗ v (4,3) p 0.40824.
This measure of speculators is increasing in the ratio of the earnings vol-
atility to the earnings mean. Liquidity-seeking shareholders suffer average
trading losses that equal the aggregate cost of information acquisition so that
their expected trading losses equal the measure of speculators times the in-
dividual cost of information acquisition. The price at which represents t p 2,
the expected future payoffsto theholder ofashare,equalsthemeanofearnings
minus expected trading losses. Denoting this function by we have:
∗ P (m,d),
∗ P (5,2) p $5,
∗ P (5,3) p $4.938,
∗ P (4,2) p $3.957, (18)
∗ P (4,3) p $3.918.
We assume that the manager’s objective is linearly increasing in the price
at The manager will report earnings smoothed to the maximum extent t p 2.
possible. The equilibrium smoothing strategy is deﬁned as follows:
If ﬁrst-period economic earnings experience a negative shock ($3 or less),
the manager reports earnings $1 higher than the economic earnings.
If ﬁrst-period economic earnings experience a positive shock ($6 or more),
the manager reports earnings $1 lower than the economic earnings.
In the second period, the manager has no choice. He must report the ag-
gregate of any outstanding “earnings balance” from the previous period and172 Journal of Business
the second-period earnings. To show that the manager smooths in a sequential
equilibrium, we specify the beliefs held by investors.
Beliefs of investors at : t p 1
If reported earnings in the ﬁrst period are low ($4 or less), economic
earnings are $1 lower than the reported earnings.
If reported earnings in the ﬁrst period are high ($5 or more), economic
earnings are $1 higher than the reported earnings.
Beliefs of investors at : t p 2
If reported earnings are high or low in both periods, the economic earnings
in each period equal the average of the two reported earnings.
If reported earnings are high in one period and low in the other, then (i)
the mean of economic earnings is the average of the two reported earn-
ings, (ii) the economic earnings are $1 less than the lower reported
earnings and $1 more than the higher reported earnings, and (iii) the
volatility is the difference between the mean and the economic earnings
in either of the two periods.
With these beliefs, investors set the price as the expected value of future
payoffs. At this price (ex-dividend) is given by the function in (18) if t p 2,
the mean and the volatility are both known and by a weighted average of
these values if there is uncertainty about the mean and the volatility. Thus,
if investors know that the sum of the mean and the volatility is $7, a mean
of $5 and a volatility of $2 is as likely as a mean of $4 and a volatility of
$3. In that case, the price at is the average of $5 and $3.918, that is, t p 2
$4.459.
The price at is the sum of the expected reported earnings at t p 1 t p 2
and the expected price at . Thus, if the manager reports earnings of $2 t p 2
at investors believe that economic earnings are $1 and that the manager t p 1,
has inﬂated his report by $1, a sum that he will have to offset in his report
of next period’s earnings. With $1 economic earnings, the mean must be $4
and the volatility must be $3. Therefore, the expected value of next period’s
reported earnings is and the expected price at is $3.918. $4  $1 p $3, t p 2
Therefore, the price at is $6.918. t p 1
Given the beliefs of investors, the manager smooths earnings. To conserve
space, we show this only for one case of high ﬁrst-period earnings and one
case of low ﬁrst-period earnings.
Consider economic earnings of $7 in the ﬁrst period. This means that
earnings experienced a positive shock. As seen fromthesummaryofinvestors’
beliefs at t p 2 given above, investors will form correct beliefs about the
mean of the earnings after observing the reported earnings in the two periods.
The manager wants to minimize investors’ estimate of volatility. If earnings
are again high ($7) in the second period, investors will infer that the economic
earnings were $7 in each period regardless of what the manager reports. The
only case in which the manager’s report may inﬂuence investor perceptionsEarnings 173
erroneously is when earnings are low in the second period. If the manager
smooths as expected and reports$6, investorswill inferthateconomicearnings
were $7 in the ﬁrst period, and they will form correct beliefs. If, however,
the manager does not smooth, investorsmaysometimesoverestimatevolatility.
Suppose, for example, that the manager truthfully reports $7. Investors will
think that the economic earnings were actually $8. Suppose that economic
earnings in the second period are $3. The manager reports $3 truthfully, but
this time the investors will think economic earnings were $2. In this case, the
investors correctly infer the mean to be $5 but overestimate the volatility to
be $3 instead of the actual $2. The price set in the second period will then
be $4.938, although it should have been $5. The manager will smooth in
order to maximize the second-period price.
Smoothing also occurs in the case of low earnings. Suppose that earnings
in the ﬁrst period are $2. If the manager smooths and reports $3, investors
infer economic earnings correctly. If, however, the manager does not smooth,
investors may overestimate volatility. Suppose that the manager chooses to
truthfully report $2. Investors then think that economic earnings were $1. If
economic earnings in the second period turn out to be $6, the manager again
truthfully reports $6. This time investors think that the economic earnings
were $7. They then correctly infer the mean to be $4 but overestimate the
volatility to be $3 instead of the true value of $2. The price set at is t p 2
then $3.918, whereas it should have been $3.957. The manager is once again
better off smoothing.
VI. Robustness and Qualiﬁcations
In this section, we discuss a variety of issues related to the robustness of our
analysis. We also consider possible extensions.
A. Welfare Implications
The legal and accounting environment can affect the discretion available to
the manager in reporting to ﬁnancial markets and thereby inﬂuence the extent
of earnings smoothing. What are the welfare implications of reporting dis-
cretion in the context of our model? Note, ﬁrst, that information acquisition
represents a welfare loss in our model. It simply consumes resources and
redistributes wealth across investors; the improved transparency of prices due
to informed trading has no welfare effect in our model. The fact that earnings
smoothing by ﬁrms discourages welfare-reducing information acquisition by
speculators suggests that allowing greater reporting discretion to managers
might improve welfare. However, this is not the case, since smoothing does
not reduce information acquisition as investors are not fooled in equilibrium.
That is, the measure of speculators in equilibrium is unaffected by the degree
of smoothing as long as reported earnings contain some information. Thus,174 Journal of Business
our model does not provide any argument for or against increasing reporting
discretion to managers.
However, it is true that any policy change that reduces the aggregate in-
formation acquisition cost improves welfare. For example, if an increase in
the mandatory information disclosed by ﬁrms in addition to reported earnings
were to reduce speculators’ information acquisition costs (e.g., in Boot and
Thakor, forthcoming), ﬁrms should be required to disclose information to the
extent that the marginal cost of disclosing information equals the marginal
aggregate cost of residual information acquisition by speculators acting
privately.
B. Capital Structure Assumptions
We have assumed that the ﬁrm has no debt. One implication of introducing
debt is that it could act as a signal of future cash ﬂows (e.g., Ross 1977).
However, in our model there is no informational asymmetry about future cash
ﬂows at the time that the debt issue decision would presumably be t p 0,
made. The manager becomes privately informed only when he observes the
economic earnings at . Thus, debt has no apparent signaling role in the t p 1
usual sense.
There is another aspect of debt that could, however, affect the analysis. Boot
and Thakor (1993) show that debt magniﬁes the volatility of shareholders’
claims, encourages information acquisition, and thereby increases the expected
trading losses of shareholders. Thus, keeping the volatility of earnings ﬁxed, a
higher debt-to-equity ratio increases the price discount of equity due to expected
trading losses, strengthening the manager’s smoothing propensity.
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C. Dividend Smoothing
Our rationale for earnings smoothing can be generalized to other measures
of corporate performance, such as dividends.
20 In this model, reportedearnings
and dividends are identical. In a more general model with investment,earnings
and dividends may differ. Earnings and dividends in such a model will each
carry useful valuation-relevant information, with neither being a sufﬁcient
statistic for the other. In such a setting, our model could be interpreted as
explaining both earnings and dividend smoothing. In fact, dividends can typ-
ically be smoothed more than earnings, and one does observe smoothing of
dividends even relative to a (smoothed) reported earnings stream. This is
consistent with the core intuition of our article.
D. Earnings Smoothing or Earnings Inﬂation?
Our manager smooths earnings to inﬂuence investors’ perceptions about earn-
ings volatility. We require that the uncertainty in the volatility of earnings be
high relative to the uncertainty in the mean of earnings, as formally stated in
19. This result does depend on the assumption that current shareholders are the liquidity seekers.
20. We thank two anonymous referees for suggesting this general interpretation of our results.Earnings 175
assumption 4. This assumption is critical to our results when there is trading
between dates 1 and 2.
21 If we make the opposite assumption that uncertainty
in the mean is high relative to the uncertainty in the volatility, the manager
may have an incentive to inﬂuence investors’ beliefs about the mean rather
than the volatility and would inﬂate earnings to signal a higher mean. As-
sumption 4 characterizes the conditions under which the manager’s incentive
to smooth earnings dominates the incentive to inﬂate earnings.
We suspect that, when the uncertainty in the mean is about the same as the
uncertainty in the volatility, the manager combines earnings smoothing with
earnings inﬂation. Thus, the manager reports inﬂated earnings when earnings
are low and lower-than-actual earnings when earnings are high, but the ma-
nipulation is larger when the earnings are low than when they are high.
E. Acquisition of Private Information by Shareholders
An apparently strong assumption in our analysis is that shareholdersareselling
for liquidity reasons and none of them acquire private information. This sim-
plifying assumption can be relaxed, however. The analysis uses the fact that
the expected losses of shareholders due to liquidity trading are proportional
to the information acquisition costs of the speculators. An alternative would
be to allow some of the shareholders to get informed and to endogenously
determine how many shareholders become informed. In such a model, the
marginal beneﬁt of getting informed equals the cost of information acquisition
in equilibrium, taking into account the possibility of liquidity-motivated trad-
ing losses in the future. It is difﬁcult to specify choice of information ac-
quisition, trading, and pricing in this settingwithoutimposingfurtherstructure.
However, the analysis goes through even if some speculators are shareholders
as long as all the liquidity seekers are also shareholders of the ﬁrm so that
the information acquisition costs of all speculators are still paid by the share-
holders. The key is that the measure of speculators should be increasing in
earnings volatility; this seems likely because high earnings volatility increases
the ex ante value of private information.
F. Buying and Selling by Liquidity Investors
We can also relax the restriction that all liquidity-motivated investors are
sellers; we could allow some to be buyers and some of these buyers to be
existing shareholders. In this case, the losses of liquidity trading will be borne
by all these noise (liquidity-motivated) investors. What we need is the as-
sumption that a person owning the shares of the ﬁrm is expected to lose more
due to liquidity trading than a person not owning shares. In this case, what
matters to current shareholders is the expected loss due to liquidity trading
that is in excess of the expected loss due to liquidity trading if they did not
own shares.
21. If there is no trading between dates 1 and 2, the manager’s compensation contract depends
only on the price at date 2, and our results do not require assumption 4.176 Journal of Business
G. Cost of Smoothing
We have assumed that the discretion exercised by the manager does not have
any real effects on the ﬁrm’s performance. In practice, there will be real costs
of smoothing, such as the cost of manipulating accounts and the cost of
suboptimal decisions. We have assumed that these costs are zero when the
manager manipulates earnings by less than d and inﬁnite when the manager
manipulates earnings by more than d. We suspect that a continuous cost
function will not alter the ﬂavor of the results,althoughtheextentofsmoothing
may be reduced.
H. Beneﬁts of Information Acquisition
We did not assume any public beneﬁts to information acquisition. When
information acquisition results in spillover externalities that lead to better
decisions within the ﬁrm, some of the beneﬁts of information acquisition will
also accrue to shareholders (see Allen 1993; Boot and Thakor 1997; Allen
and Gale 1999). Earnings smoothing should be less for such ﬁrms.
I. Extension to Multiple Periods
It is natural to wonder how robust our results are when the model is extended
from three periods to perpetuity. So we now provide a discussion of this issue.
This requires that we make some simplifying assumptions. First, we assume
that the mean is known with certainty and is common knowledge.Asdiscussed
earlier, uncertainty about the mean relative to the uncertainty about the vol-
atility determines whether the manager smooths or inﬂates earnings. A known
mean eliminates the manager’s incentive to inﬂate earnings. We also modify
the earnings distribution so that ﬁnitely many observations are not sufﬁcient
to completely infer the distribution. Assume that earnings in each period are
independent and identically distributed. The distribution is normal with mean
zero and an unknown variance. Everyone has common prior beliefs about the
variance (volatility).
Only the manager sees the economic earnings, based on which he reports,
with some discretion, to investors. He can report higher or lower earnings
and carry a balance to the next period. This balance, either a surplus or a
deﬁcit, cannot exceed a fraction b of the current-period earnings. In the next
period, the balance carried forward and the new earnings are available to the
manager. The manager must now report total earnings that include the balance
and at least a fraction of the new earnings and at most a fraction 1  b
of the new earnings. 1  b
Investors rationally form beliefs about economic earnings by observing re-
ported earnings. Some shareholders experience liquidity shocks in a future
period, and this is followed by trading. Some investors can acquire a private
signal about the ﬁrm’s prospects before trading in that period; they do not buy
such signals in prior periods as nobody would trade with them in the absence
of liquidity shocks. The trading mechanism is exactly the same as in our three-Earnings 177
period model.
22 It can be shown that the incentives for getting informed are
increasing in the perceived volatility of the earnings stream. Thus, the higher
the perceived volatility of the earnings distribution, the higher the measure of
speculators and the higher the expected losses of liquidity-seeking shareholders,
leading to a lower price of the shares. If the manager’s objective function is
some weighted average of prices in different periods, he wants to reduce per-
ceived volatility in those periods. One should intuitively expect the manager to
report smoothed earnings. We show that this is the case.
Deﬁnetheequilibriumsmoothingstrategyasoneinwhichthemanagerreports
earnings equal to the sum of the balance from the previous period and a fraction
ofthecurrentperiod’searnings.Supposethatinvestorsexpectthemanager 1  b
to follow this strategy in every period.
The smoothing strategy is a one-to-one mapping from economic earnings to
reported earnings. Further, investors and the manager agree that the previous
balance in the ﬁrst period is zero. If the manager smooths in the ﬁrst period,
investors infer the economic earnings as well as the true balance. Then, if the
manager again smooths in the second period, investors again infer the economic
earnings and the new balance in the second period. Thus, ifthemanagersmooths
consistently, investors infer the economic earnings in each period. The volatility
they infer from reported earnings is an unbiased estimate of the true earnings
volatility. With a normal distribution, it can be shown that thesum ofthesquared
economic earnings is a sufﬁcient statistic for estimating volatility. The higher
this sum, the higher is the estimate of volatility.
Consider a deviation by the manager from the equilibrium smoothing strategy
in any period. Suppose that, when the economic earnings in that period are
positive, the manager reports higher earnings than those dictated by the smooth-
ing strategy. Investors now infer earnings to be higher than economic earnings.
If the economic earnings are negative, suppose that the manager reports lower
earnings than dictated by the smoothing strategy. In this case, investors would
infer earnings to be lower than economic earnings. Thus, investors perceive
earnings to have a wider dispersion than that of economic earnings, which
means that their estimate of volatility is biased upward. Further, we show that
after such a deviation, this bias tends to increase in future periods.
Consider a period in which the balance from the previous period is B but
investors believe it is C. First assume that . Suppose that economic earn- B 1 C
ings are x and that the manager reports y. Investors expect the manager to
smooth and report when economic earnings are z. Therefore,from C  (1  b)z
the report y, they infer that economic earnings are . If the (y  C)/(1 b)
manager wants to minimize the magnitude of inferred earnings z, the best that
he can do is to report a value as close as possible to C. With this strategy, the
22. We will need a positive mean so that the price is never negative for the trading mechanism
to work. We are assuming zero mean just to simplify the expressions for smoothing strategy, and
a positive mean will not change the results in any way.178 Journal of Business
manager’s report and investors’ beliefs are these:
B C
   y p B x(1b),z p x, B p bx, C p bz if x 1 0;
1 b
B Cx (1b) C B
   y p B x(1b), z p  , B p bx, C p bz if ! x ! 0;
1 b (1b)1 b
C BC B
   y p C, z p 0, B p B C x, C p 0i f ! x ! ;
1 b 1 b
B CC B
   y p B x(1b),z p x, B p bx, C p bz if x ! .
1 b 1 b
Here is the balance carried to next period and is what investors think it
   BC
is. We can show that for any value of B and C, the expected value of is
2 z
more than the expected value of when x is normally distributed. We can also
2 x
see that the investors’ beliefs about next period’s balance are also incorrect.
Thus, even when the manager tries his best to reduce the magnitude of z,t h e
signal about volatility from this period is biased upward.
We can similarly consider the case where investors’ perception of the balance
C is higher than the actual balance B. In this case, the manager can reduce
investors’ perception of economic earnings z using the following strategy:
B CC B
   y p B x(1b),z p x, B p bx, C p bz if x 1 ;
1 b 1 b
C BC B
   y p C, z p 0, B p B C x, C p 0i f ! x ! ;
1 b 1 b
B Cx (1b) C B
   y p B x(1b), z p  , B p bx, C p bz if 0 ! x ! ;
1 b (1b)1 b
B C
   y p B x(1b),z p x, B p bx, C p bz if x ! 0.
1 b
We can show in this case also that the expected value of is more than
2 z
the expected value of . The balance for next period is also different from
2 x
what investors think. Thus, we see that, whenever investors’ beliefs about the
balance in a given period are incorrect, they overestimate the volatility in that
period. The manager can thus minimize perceived volatility by smoothing.
VII. Conclusion
We have developed a model in which earnings smoothing is motivated by
the desire to reduce the perceived volatility of the ﬁrm’s earnings stream and
discourage speculators from spending resources to acquire private information
that could then be used to trade against shareholders selling for liquidity
reasons. We can extract a few empirical implications from our analysis. Prop-
osition 3 shows that the manager smooths earnings when his compensationEarnings 179
is tied to .
23 Thus, the ﬁrst empirical implication is that a ﬁrm whose P 2
manager’s compensation contract is tied to long-run performance is more
likely to smooth earnings than a ﬁrm whose manager’s compensation contract
is tied to short-term performance. That is, somewhat surprisingly, earnings
smoothing is just not something that arises from a preoccupation with short-
term performance.
We have also argued that the manager’s compensation contract should be
tied to long-term performance.
24 This appears to be the case in practice. A
major component of executive compensation these days is in the form of stock
options that are given when the ﬁrm reports good results in a period but that
are valuable only if the ﬁrm continues to perform well in future periods.
A second prediction of the analysis is that the degree of earnings smoothing
will be higher for ﬁrms with higher uncertainty about the earnings volatility.
In contrast, the managers of ﬁrms with high uncertainty about their earnings
mean and low uncertainty about their earnings volatility are more likely to
report inﬂated earnings.
A third predictionisthat ﬁrmswithlargeinstitutionalownershipwillsmooth
less because institutions are less likely to sell for liquidity reasons. When
there are few liquidity-motivated shareholders, trading is driven largely by
speculators, and the order ﬂow reﬂects a lot of private information of spec-
ulators. The advantage of getting informed is low in such a setting, and few
noninstitutional investors acquire costly information. Thus, if institutional in-
vestors have owned the ﬁrm’s shares for a while and enjoy “incumbency
informational advantages,” the manager will not smoothearningssigniﬁcantly.
If the volatility of economic earnings is not correlated with the degree of
institutional ownership, we should expect reported earningsto bemorevolatile
for ﬁrms with large institutional holdings.
25 This, however, seems to be at
odds with the existing evidence.
26 We suspect this is because the volatility of
earnings is correlated with some other attribute (such as ﬁrm size) that is
considered by institutional investors in choosing stocks.
It might, however, be better to test our prediction more directly. The pre-
diction is that greater institutional ownership is associated with less earnings
smoothing. Jiambalvo, Rajgopal, and Venkatachalam (2002) test this predic-
tion and ﬁnd supporting results.
A fourth prediction is that ﬁrms with more diffuse ownership struc-
tures—numerous shareholders with each owning a relatively small fraction
of the ﬁrm—will smooth earnings more. This is because we would expect
small shareholders to be more likely to sell their shares for liquidity reasons.
This prediction can be tested with shareholder concentration data.
23. Prices formed beyond do not enter the contract because the manager’s actions do not t p 2
directly affect them.
24. The compensation will be tied to short-term performance for ﬁrms with high uncertainty
about mean and low uncertainty about the volatility.
25. We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
26. See, e.g., Potter (1992).180 Journal of Business
Future research could be directed at examining the potential asset pricing
implications of earnings smoothing. For instance, smoothing may affect the




We ﬁrst prove an intermediate result.
Lemma A1. Price is a decreasing function of net supply.
Proof. From (6),
f(Sv) ˆˆ ˆˆ (md)(md) f(S)
P(S,v) p f(Sv) 1 f(S)
is increasing in and so it sufﬁces to show that is decreasing f(Sv)/f(S), f(Sv)/f(S)
in S. The ﬁrst derivative of with respect to S is f(Sv)/f(S)
   f(Sv) f (Sv) f (S)
 , [] f(S) f(Sv) f(S)
which is negative as the slope of is decreasing in x if f is log-
  f (x)/f(x), ln[f(x)],
concave. Q.E.D.
Proof of lemma 1. We will show that
∗ ˆ df  ˆ ˆ ! m(m,d,v) ! 0, (A1) ˆ v ˆ (md)
where . From (6) and (7),
∗∗ f p f(l )
¯ l
md f(l)1




p f(l)dl .  2 f(l)(md)f(lv)(md)2
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Thus,




   f (l  v)[f(l)(m  d)  f(l  v)(m  d)]  f (l  v)(m  d)[f(l)  f(l  v)]




  2 f (l  v)f (l)
p  (m  d)d dl.  2 [f(l)(m  d)  f(l  v)(m  d)]
l




m(m,d,v) p (md)d(I I ), 12 v
where
∗ l v
  2 f (lv)f (l)
I p dl 1  2 [f(l)(md)f(lv)(md)]
l
∗ l v
  f (lv)
p dl  2 f(lv) [] (md) (md) f(l) l
∗ l v
1
  1 f (lv)dl ∗  2 f(l ) [] (md) (md) ∗ f(l v) l
since log-concavity of f implies that for and is increasing
 ∗ f (l) 1 0 l ! lf (lv)/f(l)
in l (see proof of lemma A1 above). Moreover,
¯ l
  2 f (lv)f (l)




  1 f (lv)dl ∗  2 f(l ) [] (md) (md) ∗ f(l v) ∗ l v
since log-concavity of f implies that for and is increasing




  m(m,d,v) ! f (lv)dl ∗  2 f(l ) v [] (md) (md) ∗ f(l v) l
¯ (md)df(lv)
p ! 0. ∗ 2 f(l ) [] (md) (md) ∗ f(l v)
To prove the other inequality, we have
∗ l v
  2 f (lv)f (l)
I p dl 1  2 [f(l)(md)f(lv)(md)]
l
∗ l v
  2 f (lv)f (l)
! dl  2 [f(l)(md)]
l
∗ l v
∗ 1 f(l )
  p f (lv)dl p ,  22 (md)( md)
l
and . Thus, I ! 0 2
∗∗  f(l ) df
m(m,d,v) 1 (md)d p . 2 v (md) md
Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 1. We want to show that there is a unique value of
∗ v
satisfying the conditions of equilibrium in deﬁnition 1. Taking the supply and price
functions as asserted, consider the expected trading proﬁt m of each speculator as a
function of v. This is
¯ l
ˆ ˆ 1 mdP(l,0) ˆ ˆ m(m,d,0)p f(l)dl  2 P(l,0)
l
¯ l
ˆ ˆˆ 1 mdm
ˆ p f(l)dl asP(S,0)p m  ˆ 2 m
l
ˆ d
p 1 M, byassumption2.
ˆ 2m
Further, m( .,.,v) is a strictly decreasing function of v by lemma 1. Therefore,Earnings 183
there is a unique that satisﬁes the following condition for competition among
∗ v 1 0
speculators: Q.E.D.
∗ ˆ ˆ m(m,d,v ) p M.
Proof of proposition 2.
a) From (6) and (7),
¯ l
md f(l)f(lv)1
m(m,d,v) p f(l)dl  2 f(l)(md)f(lv)(md)2
l
¯ lv l
f(l) 1 11 1 f(lv)
p f(l)dl f(l)dl . (A3)  f(l) md 22 2  f(lv) md l lv
We see that is decreasing in which is increasing in . m(m,d,v)( md)/(md), m/d
b) From a, we see that is increasing in . We know from lemma 1 that m(m,d,v) d/m
m is decreasing in . So when increases, must also increasetokeepmunchanged
∗∗ vd /mv
at M, a condition for equilibrium. We now provide a lower bound on sensitivity of
measure to volatility d for a later result:
∗ v
 mM
∗ v (m,d) 1 ,( A 4 ) 2 ∗ dd f
To prove (A4), we ﬁrst derive the following lower bound for the sensitivity of expected
trading proﬁt to volatility.
 mM




f(l) 1   1  f(lv)
m(m,d,v) p f(l)dl   f(l) md d 2 d   f(lv) md lv
¯ l
f(l)   1 m f(lv) 
p f(l)dl   2 2 f(l) md (md)   [] f(lv) md lv
¯ l
m 1
1 f(l)dl  2 f(l) md (md)  f(lv) md lv
¯ l
m f(lv)
p f(l)dl  (md) f(l)(md)f(lv)(md)
lv
mm M
p m(m,d,v) p .
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This proves (A5). To get (A4), note that in equilibrium, the measure of speculators
is such that the proﬁt of marginal speculator is M, a constant. This implies
 mM ∗  m(m,d,v )   mM dd (md)
∗ v (m,d) p 1 p , ∗ 2 ∗  df ∗ dd f m(m,d,v ) ∗ v (md)
using equations (A1) and (A5). Q.E.D.
Proof of lemma 2. The unconditional value of the ﬁrm is m. The expected value
of the future payoffs to the shareholders is, however, lower, and the difference con-
stitutes the expected value of losses suffered by liquidity seekers. When liquidity-
induced supply is l, shareholders get at by selling some shares at market $lt p 2.5
price, and they get a liquidating dividend for the remaining shares at . The market t p 3
price at depends on whether speculators demand shares or not and is t p 2.5 P(l
when third-period earnings experience positive shock and when third-
∗∗ ∗ v ,v ) P(l,v )
period earnings experience negative shock. The liquidating dividend per share is
in the former case and in the latter. The expected losses L are thus given mdm d
by
1 l 1 l
L p m  l  1  (md) f(l)dl  l  1  (md) f(l)dl  ∗ {[ ] } {[ ] } 2 P(l)2 P(l  v )
1 l(m  d)1 l(m  d)
p  l  f(l)dl  l  f(l)dl.  ∗ [] [ ] 2 P(l)2 P(l  v )
Thus,
∗ (l  v )(m  d)
∗∗ 2L p (l  v )  f(l  v )dl  ∗ [] P(l  v )
∗ (l  v )(m  d) m  d
∗  l  f(l)dl  v f(l)dl  ∗∗ [] P(l  v ) P(l  v )
∗∗ p (l  v )f(l  v )dl  lf(l)dl 
∗ (m  d)f(l  v )  (m  d)f(l) m  d
∗∗  (l  v ) dl  v f(l)dl  ∗∗ P(l  v ) P(l  v )
∗∗ p (l  v )f(l  v )dl  lf(l)dl 
m  d
∗∗ ∗  (l  v )[f(l  v )  f(l)]dl  v f(l)dl  ∗ P(l  v )
m  d
∗ p v 1  f(l)dl  ∗ [] P(l  v )
∗∗ p 2v m(m,d,v ).
The third equality is obtained by substituting for price function from equation (6), and
the last equality uses equation (7). Since in equilibrium, we get
∗ m(m,d,v ) p M
the cost of information acquisition by speculators. Q.E.D.
∗ L p Mv ,
Proof of proposition 3. We will ﬁrst show that the beliefs of the manager andEarnings 185
Fig. A1.—Smoothing strategy
the investors are rational given their strategies and then show that their strategies are
incentive compatible.
Manager’s beliefs: The manager observes at and at and can et p 1 et p 2 a1 a2
correctly infer at and at using (12). With his knowledge of and l t p 1 l t p 2 e 12 at
he forms Bayesian beliefs about m and d, using (1) and (3). l , t
Investors’ beliefs: Investors observe only the reported earnings yet they can also e , rt
correctly infer the nature of the shock to earnings, that is, and at and ll t p 1 12
respectively, using (11) and (13). The manager’s strategy at (inaccordance t p 2, t p 1
with [14]) is shown in ﬁgure A1. When investors observe an equilibrium earnings
report, they form beliefs in accordance with the manager’s strategy and infer the
following:
¯ ¯ If l p high, then e p e d (note: e d ≤ md for equilibrium e ); 1 a1 r1 r1 r1
¯ if l p low, then e p e d (note: e d ≥ md for equilibrium e ). 1 a1 r1 r1 r1
When investors observe an off-equilibrium earnings report, the sequential equilib-
rium concept allows them to hold any plausible beliefs about (see Kreps and Wilson ea1
1982), which can lead to observed reported earnings. One possible off-equilibrium
earnings report is . Here reported earnings are greater than themaximum ¯ ¯ e ≥ mdd r1
possible in equilibrium. Investors hold the plausible belief that the economic earnings
are at the highest level possible, that is, . ¯ ¯ e p md a1
Another possible off-equilibrium earnings report is Here reported ¯ e ≤ mdd. r1
earnings are lower than the minimum possible in equilibrium. Investors hold the
plausible belief that the economic earnings are at the lowest level possible, that is,
. ¯ e p md a1
Having formed beliefs about and investors must use (1) and (3) to form l e , 1 a1
Bayesian beliefs about m and d. At investors can correctly infer and using t p 2, ll 12
(11) and (13).
If then . Now, from (10), we get . Once l p l , e p ee p e p (e e )/2 12 a1 a2 a1 a2 r1 r2186 Journal of Business
investors know and they have all the information the manager has, and they ee , a1 a2
form Bayesian beliefs about m and d using (1) and (3).
If and are different, economic earnings are in one period and in ll m dm d 12
the other. Therefore, the sum of earnings is . Investors use (10) to correctly infer 2m
. m p (e e )/2 r1 r2
Thus, at investors always have the same beliefs about m as the manager. They t p 2
form rational beliefs about d. If is high, the manager’s equilibrium strategy is l1
and so investors use the rule . If this value e p e d p mdd, d p e dm r1 a1 r1
of d is too high to be feasible, investors infer that the manager did not smooth as
expected and reported higher than what he should have in equilibrium. In this case,
they assume that the economic earnings are the highest feasible value conditional on
m and that d is the highest possible value. Thus, investors believe that d p
. ¯ min(e dm,d) r1
If is low, the manager’s equilibrium strategy is and l e p e d p mdd, 1 r1 a1
so investors use the rule . If this value of d is too high to be feasible, d p me d r1
investors infer that the manager did not smooth as expected and reported lower than
what he should have in equilibrium. In this case, they assume that the economic
earnings are the lowest feasible value conditional on m and that d is the highest possible
value. Thus, investors believe that . ¯ d p min(me d,d) r1
Investors’ strategy: The investors form rational expectations about future earnings
using (1) and (2) with their beliefs about m and d. The price set by investors in (15)
is the competitive price. Using the fact that expected value of future earnings is u,
we can simplify (15) to
1 ∗ 22 ˆˆ ˆ E [3mdMv (E [m],E [d])]e if l p high r11 P p 11 ∗ 22 ˆˆ ˆ {E [3mdMv (E [m],E [d])]e if l p low, r11
2 ∗ 22 ˆˆ ˆ P p E [m]Mv (E [m],E [d]). (A6) 2
Manager’s strategy: The manager has no choice in his second-period report. For
the ﬁrst period, the manager’s problem is to choose
e p arg max Z(x,e ), r1 a1
x[e d,e d] a1 a1
where the objective function Z is
Z(x,y) p E[a(e P)(1a)PFe p x,e p y]. r11 2 r1 a1
We ﬁrst consider the case of a positive earnings shock in the ﬁrst period, that is,
. We shall analyze the two parts in separately. First, we consider the l p high Z(x,y) 1
value of shares at : t p 1
1 ∗ 22 ˆˆ ˆ e P p E [3mdMv (E [m],E [d])] r11
∗ 22 ˆˆ p E[mdFe p x]2E[mFe p x]ME[v (E [m],E [d])Fe p x] r1 r1 r1
∗ 22 ˆˆ p E[e Fe p x]2E[mFe p x]ME[v (E [m],E [d])Fe p x]. a1 r1 r1 r1
At , investors believe that . If there is another positive ¯ ¯ t p 1 e p min(e d, md) a1 r1
shock to earnings in the second period, investors will know but not the exact values ea1Earnings 187
of m and d. The expected values of m and d will be used to determine expected losses
due to liquidity selling. On the other hand, if earnings experience a negative shock
in the second period, investors will infer values of m and d, which will determine the
expected losses due to liquidity selling. Therefore,
¯¯ ¯¯ e P p min(xd,md)2E[mFmd p min(xd,md)] r11
M
∗ ¯ ¯  v {E[mFmd p min(xd,md)],
2
¯ ¯ E[dFmd p min(xd,md)]} (A7)
M
∗ ¯ ¯  E[v (m,d)Fmd p min(xd,md)].
2
The above expression becomes independent of x for . For lower values ¯ ¯ x 1 mdd
of x,

E[e PFe p x,e p y] r11 r1 a1 x
d
p 12 E[mFmd p xd]
dx
Md
∗  v (E[mFmd p xd],E[dFmd p xd])
2 dx
Md
∗  E[v (m,d)Fmd p xd]
2 dx
Md
∗ ≤ 3 v (E[mFmd p xd],E[dFmd p xd])
2 dx
Md
∗  E[v (m,d)Fmd p xd] ≤ 3.
2 dx
The ﬁrst inequality follows from assumption 4a. The second inequality follows from
assumption 4a and 4b and proposition 2b. Thus,
¯  ¯ p 0i f x 1 mdd E[e PFe p x,e p y] (A8) r11 r1 a1 ¯ { ¯ ! 3i f x ! mdd. x
Now, we consider the expected value of price at : t p 2
E[PFe p x,e p y] 2 r1 a1
2 ∗ 22 ˆˆ ˆ p E[E [m]Mv (E [m],E [d])Fe p x,e p y]. (A9) r1 a1
We saw earlier that at investors have the same beliefs about m as the manager. t p 2
Therefore, .
2 ˆ E[E [m]Fe p x,e p y] p E[mFe p y] r1 a1 a1
If earnings experience another positive shock in the second period, investors will
infer and calculate correct expected values of m and d. If earnings experience a ea1188 Journal of Business
negative shock in the second period, investors will infer m and assume d p
. Thus, ¯ min(e dm,d) r1
E[PFe p x,e p y] 2 r1 a1
M
∗ p E[mFe p y] v (E[mFe p y],E[dFe p y]) (A10) a1 a1 a1 2
M
∗ ¯  E[v (m,m i n( xdm,d))Fe p y]. a1 2
We see from equations (A7) and (A10) that the manager’s objective function is
independent of x for . Therefore, we only need to compare reporting ¯ ¯ x 1 mdd
strategies with . We will now show that, when the economic earnings ¯ ¯ x ≤ mdd
are y, the manager prefers to report rather than any other report x with yd dy
and . Consider the incremental beneﬁt to the manager of reporting ¯ ¯ xd ≤ dx ≤ mdd
x rather than following the equilibrium strategy:
Z(x,y)  Z(y  d,y) p a{E[e  PFe p x,e p y]  E[e  PFe p y  d,e p y]} r11 r1 a1 r11 r1 a1
(1  a){E[PFe p x,e p y]  E[PFe p y  d,e p y]}. 2 r1 a12 r1 a1
Using equations (A8) and (A10), we get
M
∗ ¯ Z(x,y)  Z(y  d,y) ≤ 3a{x  (y  d)}  (1  a){ E[v (m,m i n( x  d  m,d))Fe p y] a1 2
∗ ¯ E[v (m,m i n( y  m,d))Fe p y]}. a1
In the above expression, . Thus, ¯ ym p e m p d ≤ d a1
Z(x,y)  Z(y  d,y) ≤ 3a(x  y  d)
M
∗∗ ¯  (1  a){ E[v (m,m i n( x  d  m,d))Fe p y]  E[v (m,d)Fe p y]} a1 a1 2
2 (1  a)mM ¯ ≤ 3a(x  y  d)  E[min(x  d  m,d)  dFe p y]. a1 ∗ 2 ¯ 2f d
(A11)
The last inequality uses equation (A4). Now we analyze the last term in the above
expression.
¯ E[min(xdm,d)dFe p y] a1
¯¯ p E[xdmdFxdm ! d,e p y]P(xdm ! dFe p y) a1 a1
¯¯ ¯ E[ddFxdm ≥ d,e p y]P(xdm ≥ dFe p y). a1 a1
Let us denote by r the excess of reported earnings x over the equilibrium report
. That is, . We know because . Also denote ydr p xyd 0 ≤ r ≤ 2d FyxF ≤ dEarnings 189
by f the probability . Then, ¯ P(xdm ≥ dFe p y) a1
¯ E[min(xdm,d)dFe p y] a1
¯ ¯ p (xdy)(1f)(dE[dFxdm ≥ d,md p xdr])f (A12)
¯ ¯ p r(1f)(dE[dFd ≥ dr,md p xdr])f.
But,
¯¯ ¯¯ xdr ≤ (mdd)dr p mdr,
so we can use assumption 4c to get . Substituting in ¯¯ E[dFd ≥ dr, e p y] ≤ dkr a1
(A12) yields
¯ E[min(xdm,d)dFe p y] ≥ r(1f)krf p r{1 (1k)f} ≥ kr. a1
Using the above inequality and (A11), we get:
2 (1a)mMk r
Z(x,y)Z(yd,y) ≤ 3ar ∗ 2 ¯ 2f d
2 mMk r
∗ ≤ 0i fa ≤ a { . 2 ∗ 2 ¯ mMk 6f d
Therefore, if the manager prefers to report rather than x. This means
∗ a ! a , e d a1
that the manager’s strategy is incentive compatible when ﬁrst-period earnings expe-
rience a positive shock.
We now consider the case of a negative shock to ﬁrst-period earnings. We again
analyze the values of shares at and separately: t p 1 t p 2
1 ∗ 22 ˆˆ ˆ e P p E [3mdMv (E [m],E [d])] r11
∗ 22 ˆˆ p E[mdFe p x]2E[mFe p x]ME[v (E [m], E [d])Fe p x] r1 r1 r1
∗ 22 ˆˆ p E[e Fe p x]2E[mFe p x]ME[v (E [m],E [d])Fe p x]. a1 r1 r1 r1
At investors believe that . If there is another negative ¯ t p 1, e p max(e d,md) a1 r1
shock in the second period, they expect to know nothing more, and expected loss due
to liquidity selling will be determined by expected values of m and d conditional on
. If there is a positive shock in the second period, investors expect to infer exact ea1
values of m and d. Thus,
¯¯ e  P p max(x  d,m  d)  2EmFm  d p max(x  d,m  d) r11
M
∗ ¯¯  v (E[mFm  d p max(x  d,m  d)],E[dFm  d p max(x  d, m  d)])
2
M
∗ ¯  E[v (m,d)Fm  d p max(x  d, m  d)].
2
In the above expression, the ﬁrst term is clearly increasing in x. The second term is
also increasing in x because of assumption 4d. The third term is again increasing in190 Journal of Business
x because of assumption 4d and proposition 2b. The fourth term is increasing in x
because of assumption 4b. Thus, is clearly increasing in x. e P r11
Now we consider the expected value at of the price at : t p 1 t p 2
2 ∗ 22 ˆˆ ˆ E[PFe p x,e p y] p E[E [m]Mv (E [m],E [d])Fe p x,e p y]. (A13) 2 r1 a1 r1 a1
But, as we saw earlier, . Further, investors’
2 ˆ E[E [m]Fe p x,e p y] p E[mFe p y] r1 a1 a1
beliefs about d at match the manager’s beliefs if earnings experience another t p 2
negative shock in the second period. If earnings experience a positive shock in the
second period, investors believe . Thus, ¯ d p min(me d,d) r1
E[PFe p x,e p y] p E[mFe p y] 2 r1 a1 a1
M
∗  v (E[mFe p y],E[dFe p y]) a1 a1 2
M
∗ ¯  E[v (m,m i n( mxd,d))Fe p y]. a1 2
In the above expression, the ﬁrst two terms are independent of x, while the third term
is increasing in x because of proposition 2b. Thus, is increasing E[PFe p x,e p y] 2 r1 a1
in x. The manager’s expected compensation is an increasing function of E[e  r1
and both increasing in x. Therefore, the man- PFe p x,e p y] E[PFe p x,e p y], 1 r1 a12 r1 a1
ager reports the highest possible earnings, that is, . Thus, the manager’s x p yd
strategy is incentive compatible in the case of a negative shock to earnings in the ﬁrst
period. Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 4. Suppose that there is an equilibrium in which the manager
reports truthfully (no smoothing). Then investors believe that the economic earnings
are the same as reported earnings. Consider a negative shock to earnings in the ﬁrst
period. If the manager reports earnings slightly higher than economic earnings, it
increases the price at as well as the expected price at thereby increasing t p 1 t p 2,
the manager’s expected compensation. At investors will be able to determine t p 2,
the mean m correctly, whereas they may underestimate volatility due to smoothing by
the manager. Since perceived volatility adversely affects price as discussed in Section
IV, smoothing increases the expected price at . At smoothing increases t p 2 t p 1,
investors’ perception about the mean and reduces their perception about the volatility.
Both effects make the shares more attractive to investors, and thus smoothing un-
ambiguously increases the price at . t p 1
Now consider a positive shock to earnings. Suppose that economic earnings are
so that the volatility is clearly above its lowest bound. Consider the effect ¯ y 1 md,
of reporting x, slightly smaller than y, on the manager’s expected compensation. If
the ﬁrm experiences a negative shock next period, the manager will report higher than
economic earnings and thus would be able to fool investors by reducing the perceived
volatility of the ﬁrm. This increases the expected price of shares at . Smoothing t p 2
reduces the perceived mean m as well as the perceived volatility d at . These two t p 1
effects inﬂuence the price at in opposite directions. The expressions for the t p 1
prices at and are given in (A7) and (A10), respectively, when investors t p 1 t p 2
expect the manager to smooth by d. We cancel terms with d because investors expect
the manager to report truthfully, and we ignore boundary conditions to get theEarnings 191
manager’s objective as
M
∗ a x  2E[mFm  d p x]  v (E[mFm  d p x],E[dFm  d p x]) { 2
M
∗  E[v (m,d)Fm  d p x]} 2
M
∗ (1  a) E[mFm  d p y]  v (E[mFm  d p y],E[dFm  d p y]) { 2
M
∗  E[v (m,x  m)Fm  d p y]. } 2
Differentiating the above expression with respect to x and using assumptions 4a and
4b, proposition 2b, and (A4), the slope of the manager’s objective with respect to the
reported earnings x is at most
(1a)M mM
3a , 2 ∗ ¯ 2 d f
which is negative if
2 mM
a ! . 2 ∗ 2 ¯ mM 6f d
Thus, the manager strictly prefers to smooth if a is sufﬁciently small. Wheninvestors
expect truthful reporting, the shareholders of the ﬁrm have an incentive to structure
the manager’s compensation with a small enough a to induce smoothing, discourage
informed acquisition and thus reduce future trading losses when they experience li-
quidity shocks. Q.E.D.
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